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Abstract 
This study seeks to establish the role decentralised governance has played in the performance of 
primary schools in eastern Uganda. Exploratory and descriptive data drawn from 104 school managers 
and district officials participating in the study indicate that decentralised governance has strengthened 
management of the payroll, increased regularity of monitoring and supervision and introduced school 
management committees. Despite these improvements in governance, there is however evidence that 
the quality of primary education continues to be low. Only a small and declining percentage of pupils 
complete primary education, and with increasingly poor grades. This is because, for a number of 
reasons, both the supply and demand side of governance are still weak. Despite this, overall the author 
finds that decentralised governance of primary education is a positive development, as it has enhanced 
the supply side of governance. There is, however, a need to control negative practices in the supply side 
of governance, and to systematically develop the demand side of governance, if the performance of 
Ugandan pupils is to improve.    
Keywords: Primary education, decentralisation, governance, pupil performance, education managers  
Introduction  
Shortly after the introduction of the Universal Primary Education in 1997, the Government of Uganda 
decentralised governance of primary education through both supply side reforms (eg provision of 
restricted capitation and facility grants to schools, decentralising teacher recruitment and deployment 
to district levels, and decentralising school supervision) and demand side reforms (eg increased 
emphasis on citizen participation by the creation of school management committees (SMCs) to promote 
proper management and administration of schools). The aim was to eventually achieve better 
performance of pupils. However, the performance of pupils in Ugandan public schools as measured by 
proficiency in literacy and numeracy continues to be low with literacy for year six of primary (known 
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as ‘Primary 6’) standing at 40.2% in 2013 and 51.9% in 2015, and numeracy standing at 41.4% in 2013 
and 52.6% in 2015 (National Planning Authority (NPA) 2015; Ministry of Finance Planning and 
Economic Development (MoFPED) 2016; Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) 2017). The 
completion rate for primary education stood at 61.6% in 2017 with 7.2% of pupils failing to move up a 
class each year (MoES 2017). The pass rate for the Primary Leaving Examinations (PLE) stood at 86% 
and this was attributed to the low numeracy and literacy levels at Primary 6. Notably only 8.6% of 
candidates in the eastern region (our study region) obtained division 1 grades in the PLE in 2015 (Office 
of the Prime Minister (OPM) 2016). There are also geographical disparities in performance. The 
northern and eastern regions of Uganda perform worse than the central and western regions, and urban 
schools perform better than rural schools (Oluka and Opolot-Okurut 2008). In almost all regions, 
privately owned schools perform better than public primary schools; with one possible key factor being 
a lack of commitment of teachers in public schools characterised by teacher absenteeism from school 
(Mwalimu 2016; IOB 2008; World Bank 2017).  
The present study was conducted among managers of primary education in Eastern Uganda and offers 
insights which may help government to address governance issues affecting primary education. 
In their 2008 study, Oluka and Opolot-Okurut identify factors which they considered responsible for 
poor performance of primary school pupils in Uganda’s Teso region. These factors include elements 
which are school-based, teacher-based, parents-community, curriculum-related, pupil-based and policy. 
School-based factors include insufficient infrastructure and limited learning materials. Teacher-based 
factors consist of authoritarian teaching practices, discrepancy between time allocated to learning and 
time actually spent on learning, limited application of continuous assessment of pupils, limited 
communication between parents and schools, and limited community involvement in school programmes. 
Curriculum-related factors include inadequate teachers’ guides, teachers’ failure to understand the 
primary school syllabus, and poor working conditions. Pupil-based factors were listed as low learning 
ability, low reading ability, a lack of midday meals, limited time spent on homework and inequitable 
pupil–teacher ratios. Policy factors cited included an uncoordinated transfer policy for teachers, lack of 
a lunch policy, automatic promotion of pupils at the end of the year, and limited teacher motivation.  
While Oluka and Opolot-Okurut (2008) identify these factors, they do not, however, establish their 
underlying causes. Decentralised governance and the numerous reforms of Ugandan primary education 
were implemented to help solve some of these challenges. Since decentralised governance of primary 
education began in 1998, it is the District Education Committee (DEC), answerable to the District 
Council and the Ministry of Education and Sports, which recruits and deploys teachers, monitors and 
supervises schools, and facilitates SMCs – rather than the Ministry which had previously.  The present 
study explores school managers’ perception of how decentralised governance of primary education has 
impacted the performance of primary school pupils.  
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Background, literature review and policy context 
The UN’s Millennium Development Goals, succeeded in 2015 by the Sustainable Development Goals, 
aimed at enabling all children of primary school age worldwide to complete the primary school cycle, 
and for boys and girls to have equal access to education at all levels. This agenda was in line with the 
Government of Uganda’s universal primary education (UPE) policy instituted in January 1997, which 
allowed all pupils to access education. UPE provides for ‘free’ education to all children of primary 
school age (6–13 years) in Uganda. During the 1996 election campaigns President Museveni promised 
to abolish school fees and meet the cost of primary education for four children per family (Tromp and 
Datzberger 2019). The UPE was introduced to establish, provide and maintain quality education as the 
basis for human resource development, transforming society in a fundamental positive way, and provide 
the minimum necessary resources to enable every child to enroll and remain in school throughout the 
primary cycle of education. UPE aimed at making basic education accessible to the learner and relevant 
to his or her needs. UPE was also meant to meet national developmental goals, make education 
equitable, and ensure that education is affordable and accessible for all Ugandans (Yiga and Wandega 
2010; John Paul II Justice & Peace Centre 2014). 
The introduction of UPE led to a huge increase in pupil enrolment in government-aided primary schools, 
from 2.8 million in 1996 to nearly 8.5 million in 2014 (NPA 2015). In 2012, the gross enrolment ratio1 
stood at 128% while the net enrolment ratio2 stood at 92% – compared to under 20% in 1992 before the 
introduction of UPE (OPM 2016). The Office of the Prime Minister’s 2016 process evaluation 
established that UPE had made significant progress towards achievement of key objectives such as 
improving equity in and access to primary education, expanding physical facilities (OPM 2016). The 
expanded access to primary education has also led to gender parity in primary enrolment (Tromp and 
Datzberger 2019). However, it has also resulted in very high pupil–teacher ratios, scarcity of classrooms 
and textbooks, and a reduction in performance of pupils in terms of completion rates, pass rates, 
numeracy and literacy rates and inequalities if one considers completion rates and quality of education 
(John Paul II Justice and Peace Centre 2014; Tromp and Datzberger 2019).  
In rolling out UPE, the Ministry of Education and Sports has retained many core functions. These 
include contributing to the construction of basic school facilities such as classrooms and libraries; 
supervising, monitoring and training teachers (including refresher courses); providing textbooks and 
teacher guides; evaluating the UPE programme; and providing standards for the curriculum, monitoring 
and assessment (MoES 2016b). The government abolished all tuition fees, as well as parent–teacher 
association (PTA) charges for primary education. Consequently, the government provides school 
 
1 Number of students enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-
age population corresponding to the same level of education (http://uis.unesco.org/en/glossary-term/gross-enrolment-ratio).  
2 Total number of students in the theoretical age group for a given level of education enrolled in that level, expressed as a 
percentage of the total population in that age group (http://uis.unesco.org/en/glossary-term/gross-enrolment-ratio).  
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capitation and facility grants directly to schools to cover expenditure on instructional materials, extra-
curricular activities, maintenance and utilities, and administration costs; pays teacher salaries; and meets 
non-wage expenditure (Reinikka and Svensson 2004). Donor agencies and district councils also 
contribute to financing primary education, and overall, 60% of education funding at local government 
was spent on teachers in 2013/2014, followed by recurrent expenditure (16%), wages for non-teaching 
staff (11%), capital investment (8%) boarding, health and meals (3%) and learning and teaching 
materials (1%) (MoES 2016b).  
Since the introduction of decentralised governance the implementation of primary education has been 
the joint responsibility of the District Education Committee, of which the district education officer 
(DEO) is the secretary, and local communities. The DEO is answerable to the District Council and the 
Ministry of Education and Sports. The district staff (DEO and inspectors) are responsible for staffing 
primary schools. Mwalimu (2016) notes however that the quality of teachers is still low, and this 
contributes to the poor quality of education. Equally UNICEF (2020) notes that “teacher absenteeism 
and under-qualification of many teachers spell disaster for children” in Uganda (p. 1). While the pupil–
teacher ratio has improved over time from 52:1 in 2003, to 49:1 in 2009 and 46:1 in 2013, teachers are 
still few in number and have heavy workloads with the pupil–teacher ratio at 42.7:1 in 2017 (Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics 2017; Mwalimu 2016). This is compared to the world average of 21.8 and African 
average of 34.3 pupils per teacher in 2017 (The Global Economy 2020).  Teachers are unequally 
distributed among schools without regard to the ratios, and schools with similar numbers of pupils may 
have widely differing numbers of teachers (NPA 2015). Further, Uganda has never achieved a fair or 
even distribution of teachers across the country, and decentralised management has worsened the 
situation; some districts continue without functional District Service Committees meaning additional 
teachers cannot be recruited (NPA 2015). Teacher absenteeism stands high at 20–30% (NPA 2015) and 
those attending school may not be teaching in class (World Bank 2017).  
The DECs and their staff have a number of statutory responsibilities: implementing government 
education standards and policies; monitoring and supervising schools to ensure quality; distributing, 
controlling and accounting for funds allocated to the education sector by the district council; and 
ensuring good performance and quality of learning in their district. However, school inspection, 
monitoring and supervision is inadequate; and primary schools are poorly managed due to inadequate 
staffing at national and district levels, limited budgets and overlapping central and local mandates (NPA 
2015). The same report emphasises that school inspection is weakest at the local government level due 
to inadequate numbers of staff, skills and budget.  
A further complicating factor is that, under decentralised governance, community leaders are also 
responsible for monitoring and supervision. In Bukedea district, for instance, local leaders including 
local councils, religious leaders and district and sub-county staff tried to conduct periodic monitoring 
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visits but were hampered by lack of transport and inadequate support (Nanyonga and Nanziri 2013). 
Supervision and inspection of schools is in general still inadequate despite the decentralisation of 
education management, and that community participation in primary education has declined since the 
launch of UPE (NPA 2015). A later study by Ocan (2017) confirmed that community involvement is 
school activities is low, as only 21.7% of the community members who participated in the study were 
involved in school activities. Efforts to engage communities in monitoring school activities are 
hampered by low interest among community members, poor facilitation and a perception that primary 
education is purely the responsibility of government (NPA 2015). 
On the other hand, in 1998, government reintroduced SMCs as a legal entity at the school level to 
represent government and formally take control of decentralised education (MoES 1998, cited in 
Prinsen and Titeca 2008). The SMCs control all recurrent income and expenditure of the schools and 
are tasked to ensure proper and efficient management in accordance with government policy (Asiimwe 
and Nakanyike 2004). Since conditional grants were introduced, the SMCs spend the funding according 
to government specifications, namely 50% on instructional materials, 30% on co-curricular activities, 
15% on utilities and maintenance and 5% on administration (Prinsen and Titeca 2008). SMCs are also 
responsible for supervision of teacher and pupil attendance, teacher performance, monitoring the 
utilisation of school funds and ensuring that parents contribute towards pupils’ midday meals. However, 
studies have shown that most SMCs fail (Prinsen and Titeca 2008; Nanyonga and Nanziri 2013; MoES 
2017). Some SMCs have been informally captured by politicians, some who have been found to use 
their political influence to channel resources to particular schools, or by dominant individuals in society 
who may be the community representative on many institutional committees (Reinikka and Svensson 
2004; Prinsen and Titeca 2008). Furthermore, most SMC members are not active and do not know their 
roles and responsibilities (Nanyonga and Nanziri 2013; MoES 2017).  
Under UPE, parents are expected to provide exercise books, pens, uniforms and lunch. However, 
Nanyonga and Nanziri (2013) show that in Bukedea district, parents cannot always contribute towards 
midday meals for their children even when they know that it is their responsibility. Ezati et al. (2016) 
notes that in northern Uganda there are several factors that contribute to parents’ limited involvement 
in children’s education including “poverty, dislocation, fear, alcohol consumption, and 
misunderstanding of policy” (p. 10).  Some northern Ugandan parents fail to provide exercise books for 
their children and textbooks for both teachers and pupils because they cannot afford them (Oluka and 
Opolot-Okurut 2008). The absence of textbooks affects both teaching and learning, compromising the 
quality of education. For example, the 2019 UWEZO annual assessment report showed a decline in 
numeracy and literacy levels of primary 3–6 pupils. “The percentage of P3-P7 children who could read 
and comprehend a basic story at P2 level dropped from 39% in 2015 to 33% in 2018”, while those who 
could do P2 division dropped from 52% in 2015 to 45% in 2018 (UWEZO 2019). 
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Indeed, the national government’s budget speech 2015/2016 indicates that the education sector in 
Uganda still faces challenges in delivering quality education in an efficient manner, despite 
decentralised governance. For instance, the UWEZO report 2019 shows that proficiency in numeracy 
and literacy has been declining with the percentage of P3–P7 children who could read and comprehend 
a basic story at P2 level dropping from 39% in 2015 to 33% in 2018. Also, the percentage of P3–P7 
children who could do P2 division dropped from 52% in 2015 to 45% in the same period (UWEZO 
2019). The retention rate from Primary 1 to Primary 5 declined marginally from 60.6% to 59.9% 
between 2014 and 2015, and that from Primary 5 to Primary 7 declined from 32.9% to 30% in the same 
period (MoFPED 2016). The decline in proficiency and retention of pupils was attributed to persistent 
absenteeism, late reporting, and early departure from work by teachers, and the low level of salaries 
paid to teachers and head teachers (MoFPED 2016; World Bank 2017). This again confirms that 
teachers heavily influence the performance of pupils.   
The national measure for primary completion – namely, cohort survival rate to Primary 7 in 2015 stood 
at only 30.1% (MoES 2017) meaning that the dropout rates are high at upper primary which results in 
low transition to secondary level education. Notably the transition rate from Primary 7 to senior one 
(S1) increased by 12.3% from 50.9 % in 2007 to 63.2% in 2015 (MoES 2017). The government has 
attributed this to inadequate school monitoring and teacher supervision; inadequate community 
participation through SMCs and PTAs and under-funding of primary schools (OPM 2016; MoES 2017).  
The quality of primary education is also reflected in Uganda’s Primary Leaving Examination (PLE) 
results. For instance, in 2015, 621,401 pupils registered for the PLE but only 601,777 actually sat the 
exams and 600,868 were graded. Analysis of the 2015 PLE results shows that only 517,895 candidates 
passed, of which only 8.6% were in division 1 (the top band) and 39.0% in division 2. Another 38.6% 
fell in divisions 3 and 4, while 82,972 (13.8%) pupils did not pass (MoES 2016a). This shows that the 
great majority of pupils pass in divisions 2, 3 and 4 – which are not grades for entry into top secondary 
schools in the country.  
The performance of primary education is also characterised by regional disparities. Although UPE has 
equalised access to education, it has not equalised education quality and performance (Higgins 2009). 
For example, the World Bank’s (2012a) study on poverty trends in Uganda as well as the study by 
Essama-Nssah (n.d.) have found that the eastern and northern regions in Uganda have the highest pupil–
teacher and pupil–classroom ratios compared to their counterparts in central and western regions and 
this points to a wide variation in the quality of primary school education. 
Urban schools also perform better than rural schools, and private schools tend to perform better than 
public schools. Private schools have relatively better school management which leads to higher pupil 
and teacher attendance, better motivated teachers, better management of resources and a better school 
environment (NPA 2015) and good school management is necessary for improved school outcomes.  
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There are several documented governance challenges facing education systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
including  lack of funding, inadequate infrastructure especially in rural areas, insufficient qualified and 
motivated teachers, lack of qualified education managers, inadequate policy frameworks, inequality 
issues, lack of participatory decision-making, and difficulties in implementing appropriate 
accountability and supervision systems (Baghdady and Zaki 2019; Kadir 2019).   For instance in 
Cameroon primary education has been characterised by poor quality standards and disparities between 
rich and poor, boys and girls, rural and urban areas, and regions (World Bank 2012b). This report 
suggested that challenges faced by the education system in Cameroon are significantly linked to 
governance and management issues, concluding that “accountability for school functioning and 
performance is weak and the monitoring of teachers’ performance in the classroom is fractured and 
ineffective” (p. 1). Resource allocation was ineffective, and citizen participation had little impact, both 
of which affected performance in primary schools.   
Uganda is therefore not alone in having a governance dilemma in the management of primary education. 
Despite the stated partnership between policy-makers, implementers and beneficiaries in its 
decentralised governance, there is declining performance and quality of primary education. Although 
stakeholders at local districts, schools and parents are expected to contribute towards attaining education 
goals, these beneficiaries are under-researched and neglected in terms of documenting the critical 
contribution and views about their impact (Okurut-Ibore 2015).  
With this backdrop in mind, this study seeks to analyse in what ways school managers feel decentralised 
governance of primary education affects performance outcomes.   
Methodology 
The study was conducted among primary school managers (comprising district education officials, head 
teachers and deputy head teachers of primary schools) in the districts of Bukedea, Tororo, Budaka and 
Butaleja in the eastern region of Uganda. These managers were participating in a World Bank-funded 
project entitled the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), organised by the MoES and implemented 
by the Uganda Management Institute, where the author is a research academic. The GPE is a leadership 
and management capacity-building course targeting school managers in public schools in all regions of 
the country.  
The spur for the present research was the first interaction of the author with one of the GPE classes in 
Bukedea training centre. Within this class of 45 school managers, only six had students who had 
obtained any division 1 results in the 2015 PLEs. The managers attributed this to poor governance of 
the education system. One went so far as to say that “if there is something detrimental this government 
has done to this country, it is to decentralise the education sector”. This stark statement triggered the 
author’s awareness of the need to investigate the link between decentralisation and performance in 
primary education.  
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The four districts studied were selected for convenience, because they converged at Bukedea training 
centre, where the author was a trainer. School managers as a group were selected on the basis that they 
were present at the training centre and willing to participate in the study. It was felt that school managers 
were also the right category of respondent because they are in close contact with many education 
stakeholders: teachers, parents, the community and learners, among others. They therefore had up-to-
date first-hand experience and information pertaining to decentralisation of primary education and pupil 
performance. The study comprised 104 participants, 68 male (65.4%) and 36 female (34.6%); the 
unequal gender split arose because leadership positions in primary schools are largely occupied by men. 
Almost half of respondents (56/53.8%), were aged 40–49 years, and a quarter (27/25.9%) were aged 
50+ years; there was only one (1.0%) respondent in the 20–29 age bracket with the remaining 21 
(20.1%) being 30–39 years. This age distribution reflects that headship in schools is mainly awarded to 
more mature teachers. 
The research adopted a two-phased qualitative approach. The first phase was an exploratory study 
designed to establish whether education managers believed decentralised governance of primary 
education has enhanced pupils’ performance. This phase was also used to examine whether school 
managers thought primary education should be recentralised. The data in the first phase was captured 
using a questionnaire survey. Self-administered questionnaires were distributed to 150 participants and 
returned by 104 respondents (69.3%) and aimed at establishing why education managers thought 
decentralised governance had or had not improved performance of pupils in primary schools  
The results from the first phase informed the second phase which sought to establish the rationale for 
the education managers’ views on decentralised governance. Data for the second phase was drawn from 
the same respondents, using semi-structured self-administered questionnaires.  Additionally, in the 
second phase in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted in each of the four districts with two 
district education officials: the DEO and the district inspector of schools (DIS) – making a total of eight 
interviews. These district officials were purposively selected as key informants because they were 
frequently cited by head teachers and deputy head teachers during informal discussions as appropriate 
persons to give a reliable overview of the effect of primary school decentralised governance on pupil 
performance. Combining a semi-structured questionnaire and in-depth interview guide to collect data 
can help provide broader and more in-depth insights into the governance of primary education. The data 
captured from the semi-structured questionnaires was coded using Excel and analysed by thematic 
analysis. Raw data drawn from semi-structured questionnaires and in-depth interviews were studied, 
using Excel to code and develop patterns from it across different interviews and questionnaires. 
Thereafter themes were developed as reflected in the headings and subheadings in the findings and 
discussion section below.     
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Study findings and discussion 
The results show that just over half of the respondents (56/53.8%) believed decentralisation of primary 
school education had not enhanced performance of pupils, but also, interestingly, just under half 
(48/46.1%) felt it had improved performance. On the question of whether primary education should be 
recentralised or not, again it was a split in views, with less than half (41/39.4%) agreed to the suggestion, 
while (63/60.6%) did not. Therefore, although a majority – albeit a slim one – of managers claimed that 
decentralised governance had not enhanced performance, a larger majority nevertheless wanted to retain 
it. The views expressed are therefore nonconclusive. This section explores the findings in more detail 
to establish how these conflicting views are realised, and whether they can be reconciled. 
Perceived benefits of decentralised governance of primary education  
A large proportion of respondents (76.9%) did report that decentralised monitoring and evaluation has 
in some ways improved performance of pupils. It has eased school monitoring and supervision, 
enhanced access to and management of teacher welfare services, and increased ownership and 
involvement of communities in school programmes (see Table 1). 
Table 1:  Perceived benefits of decentralised governance of primary education  
Perceived benefits  Number of 
responses 
(out of 104) 
Percentage 
(%) 
Enhanced school monitoring and supervision    
Easier monitoring, supervision and evaluation of service delivery of school 
programmes  
80 76.9 
Teachers taking greater responsibility for results – eg following up on children who 
do not regularly attend school  
23 22.1 
Local leaders taking greater responsibility for results – eg monitoring and reporting 
cases of absenteeism  
38 36.5 
Enhanced access to and management of teacher welfare services    
Delivery of salaries and services nearer to civil servants/teachers, making it easy 
to correct payroll issues 
79 76.0 
Easier and faster to manage and access payroll services 56 53.8 
Faster feedback on local education issues and programmes  45 43.2 
Enhanced ownership and involvement of communities in school 
programmes 
  
Greater involvement of stakeholders in school programmes, fostering community 
ownership and increasing performance of learners 
36 34.6 
Desire by locally born teachers to boost educational performance of their home 
area, meaning they give more support to pupils 
46 44.2 
Increased local autonomy via the introduction of SMCs  7 6.7 
Source: Primary data from fieldwork 
For example, it was felt that decentralised governance has increased the regularity of inspection and 
provides opportunity for inspectors to engage and advise pupils and teachers. The district inspectorate 
can conveniently and ably get to the furthest schools in the district and can spend ample time with pupils 
and teachers to understand issues in a given school.  
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One respondent affirmed this:   
It has brought about quick monitoring, assessment and controlling situations at primary 
schools. Inspectors come and advise and when it is necessary, they can make more than 
one visit in a term. For instance, some teachers are warned against absenteeism 
(participant from Bukedea district).  
Another participant from a different district echoed this observation: 
Effective inspection, supervision and monitoring of schools and education programmes 
has made teachers improve their teaching methods and upgrade their careers. Even when 
inspectors meet pupils, they are able to advise them on their performance and obligations 
in schools. This has often encouraged pupils to work hard (participant from Budaka 
district). 
Pupils’ and teachers’ attendance is monitored, and those who have a habit of dodging lessons can be 
reprimanded. While literature (see NPA 2015) suggests that inspection, monitoring and supervision is 
inadequate, according to the findings above, the little that exists is viewed by the respondents to be well 
carried out and inspectors dedicate more time to advising school actors than before.  
Respondents also felt the participation of local leaders and teachers in monitoring has improved 
attendance of pupils and retention of children from one year to the next. Decentralised monitoring and 
supervision have reduced absenteeism, and this was cited in the responses as one of the reasons some 
primary schools in eastern Uganda were beginning to register improved performance. Although 
participation of local leaders in supervision and monitoring of primary education is low (Nanyonga and 
Nanziri 2013; NPA 2015; MoES 2017), evidence suggests that the little that does take place contributes 
to retention of children and reduces teacher absenteeism.  
Decentralised governance also minimises the time that teachers spend on administrative issues and 
enables them to spend more contact time with pupils. For example, teachers no longer have to spend 
their meagre resources on travelling to the centre to deal with payroll issues. A study respondent said: 
Management of teachers’ payroll at the district has reduced the expenses of travel to the 
headquarters (central government) just for correction of payment issues. Teachers do not 
have to miss lessons, which can translate into better performance of schools (participant 
from Butaleja district). 
However, the NPA did note in its 2015 report that this has had a downside of additional ‘ghost’ (non-
existent) teachers, pupils and schools and is likely to undermine efficient use of resources. Additionally, 
while teachers may have more time, this does not necessarily translate into more teaching. An earlier 
report on the impact of universal primary education had estimated teacher absenteeism to be 20%–30% 
(IOB 2008). The newly streamlined payroll system does not however guarantee regular payment of 
salaries, or regular salary increases, as payment still depends on central government releases. Indeed 
almost half (45/43.3%) of respondents noted that teachers do not always work diligently – even if they 
get their pay on time – simply because the working conditions are still inadequate. This is supported by 
the NPA analysis (2015) which shows that although budget allocation to the education sector has been 
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increasing in nominal terms, the wage bill has remained stagnant and the small increment available has 
been affected by inflation. As such, teacher welfare is poor and has been a cause of numerous strikes in 
schools, which have negatively affected teaching and learning (Namara and Kasaija 2016).  
Decentralisation has made it easier for educators to access and consult top officials such as the Chief 
Administrative Officer and the District Service Commission. For example, the information management 
system at the district is open to head teachers so they can verify information regarding teachers and 
administrators, and teachers’ and other employees’ grievances are more easily and more quickly 
handled at district level. Devolving information management to district level has therefore brought some 
benefits, but it has also created duplication as the same information can be captured by several 
ministries, including public service, local government, and education and sports (NPA 2015).  
Decentralised governance has also given parents and other stakeholders a say in school matters, which 
enhances concerted efforts towards better performance. As one respondent commented: 
Decentralisation has enabled some school programmes to be run by the PTA, SMC – such 
as organising testing exercises for continuous assessment of learners in UPE (government- 
aided schools), thereby exposing pupils to the exams done by other districts. The 
involvement of SMCs is an important feedback mechanism to the schools on the regular 
performance of pupils and what parents think (participant from Bukedea district). 
However, research has shown that community participation in primary education is still low, and that 
communities were still taking insufficient ‘ownership’ of local schools. SMCs – structures in which 
parents are expected to be involved – are reported as having failed to succeed (Nanyonga and Nanziri 
2013; MoES 2017).  
Study participants felt that the employment of people born in the local area as teachers and 
administrative staff enhances ownership. Some perceived that ‘native’ teachers are more motivated to 
boost education standards in the district, since it is their own community. One respondent noted:  
The last PLE results were better than before since the teachers who were recruited are 
from within the area and region. Teachers from within the community tend to be more 
committed to the children than those from other districts (participant from Tororo district). 
Another commented: 
Teachers are working more effectively since they are nearer their homes and places of 
birth and can therefore easily handle family problems in time, making them more 
comfortable. This translates into better performance at work since they spend most of the 
time at school and this can improve grades at school (participant from Budaka district). 
Recruitment and deployment of ‘native’ teachers provides local employment for teachers; so in general 
they should be closer to their home and therefore able to give more time to school activities, leading to 
better PLE performance. However, the poor PLE grades achieved in eastern Uganda do not necessarily 
support this assumption, and further study is to examine this relationship. 
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Perceived disadvantages of decentralised governance of primary education 
Several concerns were raised in relation to decentralised governance of primary education, as listed in 
Table 2. These included nepotism, intimidation, politically motivated transfers of teachers and 
headteachers, and poor monitoring and supervision. Although decentralisation was commended for 
increasing opportunities to employ ‘native’ (i.e. locally born) teachers, and also to boost ownership of 
school programmes, respondents also had concerns over increased nepotism, which is seen to have a 
negative impact on performance. Not only does nepotism makes supervision and accountability difficult 
– since workers failing to perform up to expectation are less likely to face sanctions – it also has results 
in the deployment of inexperienced teachers, who remain cocooned in their districts of origin and fail 
to gain necessary experience in a range of environments. Such appointees can lack role models and 
exposure to new ideas, can be subject to limited benchmarking, and face no competition.  
Table 2: Perceived disadvantages of decentralised governance of primary education 
Perceived disadvantages  Number of 
responses 
(out of 104) 
Percentage   
(%) 
Decentralised governance has bred nepotism and job-related conflict 89 85.6 
Nepotism has held back performance because good teachers from other 
tribes/districts are excluded from recruitment 
35 33.7 
There is lack of exposure of ‘native’ teachers to wider teaching experience and 
ideas 
35 33.6 
Under decentralised governance, political leaders tend to exert undue influence 
on schools’ administration 
67 64.4 
Increased opportunity for politicians to interfere in the education system (e.g. by 
arbitrarily transferring teachers, head teachers and district education officers) 
which compromises performance of schools 
19 18.2 
Some district officials lack respect for teachers 20 19.2 
Many teachers and school managers are demoralised because their 
appointments are on an ‘acting’, not ‘substantive’, basis  
36 34.6 
Staff deployed to monitor and supervise the teaching and learning process are 
not trained for this role 
33 31.7 
Source: Primary data 
As a result of nepotism, school leadership and management bend regulations to avoid antagonising 
relatives, friends or politicians. Beneficiaries of nepotism are more likely to absent themselves, fail to 
complete the syllabus, or refuse to implement school regulations. 44% of respondents felt that nepotism 
fosters selfish behaviour, rather than unity to promote performance, yet there is limited supportive 
supervision. One respondent observed: 
Nepotism and tribalism have made job opportunities so hard to get in the education sector. 
This is because even those who commit crime are never apprehended or penalised because 
[those in charge] employ relatives. Most employees are related to one another so no one 
can ably supervise and deliver the findings of inefficiency genuinely to government 
(participant from Bukedea district). 
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Another echoed: 
Me, as a head teacher, I have nothing [I can] do to ineffective teachers. This is because I 
see them come and I see them go. Am not consulted when they are being employed or 
deployed or redeployed. Even then, if these teachers are relatives to some politicians, then 
as a head teacher you have to be careful the way you handle them otherwise you will lose 
your job (participant from Tororo district).  
Nepotism has also increased corruption in the recruitment process. As two respondents commented: 
It has raised corruption, since the top managers look at their own people when it comes to 
key offices, even when they do not have the relevant qualifications (participant from 
Butaleja district). 
It is common practice that officials are compromised by the non-performers since they are 
their relatives or kinsmen whom they gave jobs (participant from Budaka district). 
These findings echo those of the NPA (2015) that decentralisation has worsened teacher deployment 
and utilisation, in the sense that there is limited openness and fairness in recruitment. 
Teacher recruitment policy was also criticised. The existing policy allows enrolment of general primary 
teachers rather than subject specialists, and anyone qualified as a primary teacher can teach any subject 
at primary level. This compromises the quality of the knowledge imparted to pupils, as teachers do not 
focus on particular subjects. One district education official expressed their dissatisfaction on this point 
thus: 
To us recruitment is informed by the number of children a given school has. When we 
advertise in government we do not specify that we need a specialist in [for example] 
English. We say we need a primary school teacher. Therefore, you may find a school has 
more science teachers and there may be no teacher of English… This is not happening in 
private schools, for they are specific on the skills they are interested in (participant, district 
official). 
While it is important for teachers to be multi-skilled, the current recruitment and deployment practice 
seems to compromise the quality of learning because ‘general’ teachers may not understand the 
curriculum in specialist areas, and may thus be forced to deliver ‘half-baked’ content (Oluka and 
Opolot-Okurut 2008; Mwalimu 2016).   
Decentralised recruitment and deployment have also increased the number of arbitrary transfers of 
teachers and managers, which hinders them from consolidating their work, and impacts learning. 
Discussions with district officials and school managers revealed a couple of factors driving these 
transfers. Politicians, PTAs and SMCs tend to lobby DEOs for the transfer of teachers they are not 
comfortable with. Reasons given include poor teacher performance, or even unprofessional behaviour 
such as alcoholism or harassment of pupils. If these transfers are not implemented by the DEO, 
politicians – through councils – complain, for example, of imaginary collusion between the DEO and 
the teachers or head teachers, aiming to cause fear and tension among DEOs and forcing such officers 
to lose their jobs. As a result, DEOs often implement transfer directives made by politicians or even 
councils.  
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As noted by one district official: 
Our role is to advise politicians to follow education policies and standards, but our hands 
are tied and we fear to antagonise politicians. Sometimes they misguide parents and you 
find everyone is against you because you are insisting on implementing a policy 
(participant, district official). 
Although the existing literature does not allude to teacher intimidation as a cause of teacher attrition, 
discussions with district officials in this research indicate that it is one of the reasons why teachers 
resign. This in turn contributes to high pupil–teacher ratios. Nationally, Uganda’s teacher attrition rate 
was estimated to be 5% per year in 2010 (Haddad and Adubra 2010).  
More generally, this study found that politicians exert considerable influence on school administration. 
This resonates with findings by Reinikka and Svensson (2004) and Prinsen and Titeca (2008) that 
politicians have informally captured SMCs to access resources from particular schools. Although these 
scholars emphasised the capture of financial resources, politicians’ influence affects management of 
human resources as well. District officials have also been reported as intimidating teachers and head 
teachers; for example, teachers are liable to face insults if they go to district offices with complaints or 
other official issues. One teacher lamented:  
The officials actually ‘own’ the district and can do anything to you as a teacher. We are 
at their mercy (participant from Tororo district). 
The intimidation and insults demotivate the teachers and compromise teaching and learning, resulting 
in poor performance of pupils.  
Working in an ‘acting’ capacity as a school manager also seems to compromise governance and 
accountability and decrease performance. This is because head teachers cannot assert themselves or 
exercise full powers while in an ‘acting’ capacity. District officials noted that confirming head teachers 
or their deputies in post requires additional funding for salaries and wages. Although the education 
budget expands every year in nominal terms, it has been declining in real terms (NPA 2015) meaning 
that little money is available for confirming staff posts.  
Monitoring and supervision were seen by many as poor, characterised by unqualified monitors and 
supervisors. For instance, stakeholders from school foundation bodies such as SMCs and PTAs, as well 
as those assigned to inspect schools, may not always be up-to-date on the education system and the 
latest government policies. Due to varied training, knowledge and capacity, they may make incorrect 
judgements and observations during supervision of schools, and give poor guidance to school managers.  
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As three respondents noted: 
There is no proper training for the SMC/PTA members; they lack knowledge and skills due 
to lack of capacity-building and leadership training (participant from Bukedea district).  
A lot of operations are left in the hands of stakeholders, yet they may not be well versed in 
government policies and operations – making it hard for the programmes to run efficiently. 
As a school manager you get all sorts of advice which may not be in line with required 
standards (participant from Tororo district). 
There are undefined policies in the education sector – such as the unqualified monitors 
and supervisors who are mandated yet know nothing about education. The likes of the 
politicians, who are even supported by the central government, have jeopardised the 
education system and operations, undermining performance in these schools (participant 
from Budaka district). 
The assumption that anyone can monitor, inspect and supervise primary education without necessarily 
being equipped with guidelines and tools has further weakened the monitoring function. It is therefore 
not surprising that the 2015 NPA report indicated school supervision is weakest at local government 
level. Okurit-Ibore (2015) maintained the need for stakeholder dialogue at district, school and 
community levels so as to increase stakeholders’ capacity and commitment to education.  
Other factors affecting performance of primary education 
The study also sought to establish other factors beyond decentralised governance that have contributed 
to poor performance of primary schools in the districts of study. Table 3 indicates the wide range of 
factors cited, including high pupil–teacher ratios and overcrowded classrooms, poor and delayed 
salaries, misinterpretation of government education policies, and negative attitudes and culture towards 
education. 
Table 3: Other factors affecting performance in primary education 
Other factors contributing to poor performance of pupils Number of 
responses 
(out of 104) 
Percentage 
(%) 
Teachers are demoralised due to delayed salaries even after decentralisation 
of payments 
56 53.8 
General negative attitude towards education among parents, other 
stakeholders and learners 
52 50.0 
Parental negligence, eg failure to provide pupils with midday meals 45 43.3 
High pupil to teacher ratio and overcrowded classrooms 45 43.3 
Remuneration for teachers is too low, meaning good ‘native’ teachers move to 
other districts where parents top up salaries 
44 42.3 
Lack of midday meals at school makes it hard for teachers and pupils to 
concentrate on the teaching/learning process 
39 37.5 
Source: Primary data from fieldwork 
Inadequate infrastructure to support the large school-age population is an issue that government has 
been grappling with. For some schools, learning is still taking place under trees and lessons are 
interrupted when it rains, resulting in failure to complete syllabi due to loss of time, demotivation of 
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learners and high drop-out rates. The NPA 2015 report and the OPM in 2016 both attribute the high 
pupil–teacher ratio to the increasing population, but some districts lack enough funding to recruit 
enough staff and those left can do nothing except cover the work of those who leave (NPA 2015), yet 
70% of local government education funding is still said to be spent on teachers’ salaries (MoES 2016b) 
an indication that the available funding is still a constraining factor.  
Some good teachers move, looking for greener pastures, in some cases due to a lack of adequate 
accommodation at schools (Oluka and Opolot-Okurut 2008) and a lack of midday meals – the latter 
causing teachers rush to their homes after teaching or during lunchtime, leaving learners less time to 
consult and revise with them. As noted by a respondent: 
Lack of teachers’ accommodation; by the time teachers arrive they are already too 
exhausted to deliver effectively (participant from Bukedea district). 
Another echoed:  
Teachers in most cases have to leave school at lunchtime in the name of looking for lunch 
and do not return for the afternoon sessions (participant from Tororo district).  
This, combined with lack of midday meals for children, was seen to have contributed to poor 
performance in some primary schools.  
Another important factor is parents’ neglect of their role in education. Parents are said to have negative 
attitudes towards supporting and supplementing government efforts, for example by feeding learners at 
school and providing the necessary scholastic materials: books, pens, uniform. If pupils absent 
themselves, parents also may not reprimand them or encourage them to attend school. Nanyonga and 
Nanziri (2013) also found that parents in Bukedea district, for example, were not able to contribute 
towards midday meals for children even when they knew it was their responsibility. Consequently, 
children miss some classes and others may drop out because of patchy attendance. As a respondent 
noted: 
High rate of absenteeism on the side of the learners makes it hard for the learners to 
perform since they miss a lot of lessons (participant from Budaka district). 
There are of course further factors. These include girls’ failure to attend school during the menstrual 
cycle, especially those who have no sanitary supplies provided by their parents (Miiro et al. 2018). A 
further factor may be parents believing that the government should give the learners everything, from 
food to scholastic materials and uniform. Further, some parents marry off their young daughters of 
school age to older men, to get a few heads of cattle (Oxfam and We-Care 2018).  This not only affects 
completion rates of primary education, but also the attitudes of children towards education.  
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Some teachers have a negative attitude towards teaching because they do not earn enough money to 
improve their livelihoods and therefore undertake teaching as a side occupation. Teachers in this 
situation develop poor customer care and a general lack of concern for pupils’ performance. As one 
respondent noted: 
The stakeholders, including teachers and administrative staff, have a negative attitude 
towards school programmes since they do not yield money enough to sustain them; it is 
more of voluntary work. They even fail to pay school fees for their children to attend good 
schools. Teachers cannot even afford medical fees for their families and are expected to 
do miracles in terms of performance (participant from Tororo district).  
Unemployment among educated youth also demotivates pupils from completing their education, since 
better education may not immediately translate into a job. One respondent pointed out:  
Even the learners have developed a negative attitude towards education; all they see in 
education is to enable them get white-collar jobs on completion. Yet the situation has been 
different since their bigger relatives who may have completed school are in the villages 
idle and drinking ‘ajono’ [local millet brew] (participant from Bukedea district). 
Reasons for preferring decentralised governance, despite its shortcomings  
Taking everything into account, however, as noted at the start of this paper most respondents did support 
decentralised governance of primary education. When asked why, the author found that this appears to 
be principally for practical reasons, which are listed in Table 4 below.  
Table 4: Reasons for preferring decentralised governance, despite its shortcomings 
Factors in support of decentralised governance of primary education Number of 
responses 
(out of 104) 
Percentage 
(%) 
Problems related to payroll are easily and quickly solved since they are handled 
at district level 
68 65.3 
Recruitment of teachers is done locally, allowing districts to source desired 
abilities, knowledge and skills  
64 61.5 
Salaries are released on time 63 60.6 
Inspection, monitoring and supervision of school programmes and activities has 
been made easier and is done more regularly 
56 53.8 
Decentralisation has brought employment opportunities to local communities 
which enables more teachers to be absorbed in the system  
42 40.4 
Establishment of more primary schools, reducing the distances pupils have to 
travel 
23 22.1 
More classrooms have been constructed and more teachers recruited 21 20.2 
Easy access to district officials since they are locally based  16 15.4 
Local stakeholders are now are playing a big role in running schools  16 15.4 
Bureaucracy is reduced, allowing more time for delivering education  12 11.5 
Teachers do not have to move away from their homes to work, meaning families 
are less likely to be separated 
8 7.7 
Data management and communication are faster and easier  6 5.8 
Procurement of school supplies is faster than before and more efficient  5 4.8 
Source: Primary data from fieldwork 
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Decentralised governance is widely perceived by the study respondents as having improved teachers’ 
welfare. Payroll issues are easily solved at district level and teachers take less time to access the payroll 
(65.3% of respondents), salaries are more likely to be paid on time (60.6%), districts can employ the 
teachers they need (61.5%), and though reported by few respondents, teachers are more likely to be 
local (40.4%), which helps with family cohesion as teachers do not have to move away from their home 
districts. Additionally, more classrooms have been constructed and more teachers recruited.  
A small majority of respondents also felt that decentralised governance has improved inspection, 
monitoring and supervision of school programmes and activities (53.8%), reporting that now more 
regular and corrective actions are easily undertaken. However, very few (5.8%) also felt that 
decentralised governance had eased data capture and communication with stakeholders. 
Reflection and conclusions 
Decentralised governance and the administrative reforms that have come with it, such as decentralised 
management of the payroll and regular monitoring and supervision of primary school programmes, has 
strengthened the supply side of governance of primary education. Communication and grievance 
handling are quicker, and teachers are perceived to spend more time in class than before.  
Respondents also felt that DEOs do try to follow guidelines in recruitment of staff members, and SMCs 
follow guidelines in expenditure of conditional grants from central government. The district officials 
follow up with school managers to ensure they account for the funds and materials they receive and on 
occasion, the findings suggest that dishonest staff are apprehended if inspectors confirm their 
culpability. This form of transparency is known as public accountability (World Bank 2010). Public 
accountability improves control and efficiency in service delivery and is critical to ensure control and 
enforcement of government standards and policies.  
However, the supply side of governance in education in Uganda is nevertheless still riddled with poor 
practices such as nepotism, intimidation of teachers and school managers, low pay, political 
interference, transfer of teachers without consultation, and poor monitoring and supervision. These are 
all barriers to achieving better education outcomes, as they undermine teacher motivation. Certain 
policy and practice reforms, such as the recruitment of generalist rather than specialised teachers, the 
purchase and distribution of textbooks which are not requested by schools, and the intimidation of DEOs 
by politicians, further impede efforts to ensure full public accountability.  
Decentralised governance of primary education has however created social accountability structures in 
the form of SMCs and PTAs. Social accountability is a valuable demand side mechanism to ensure 
responsiveness of government and improved quality of service delivery. SMCs do appear to have 
increased participation of parents and other stakeholders in implementation of school programmes. This 
has boosted the number of stakeholders monitoring school activities, and it was viewed that the 
performance of school managers as well as learners has to some extent improved because of this. In 
some instances, the attendance of learners had increased and innovations introduced such as regular 
assessment geared towards performance improvement.  
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This ‘demand’ side of governance seems, however, to be underdeveloped for the following reasons. 
Firstly, many SMCs were viewed to have been captured by domineering politicians and very few 
members of the committees are actively involved. This leads to a second problem, namely that SMC 
members are not conversant with their roles and responsibilities and do not have the required skills, for 
instance to conduct monitoring according to government standards and guidelines. A third problem is 
that other stakeholders involved in monitoring school performance (eg politicians, church leaders and 
the public) have no clear communication and feedback mechanisms through which to address issues.  
The research also suggests that decentralised governance on its own is not sufficient to address poor 
performance in primary schools in eastern Uganda. This is because other structural factors are also at 
work. These include inadequate funding, high pupil–teacher ratios, overcrowded classrooms, low and 
delayed salaries, negative attitudes towards education, and misapplication of certain education policies.  
There is therefore a need to strengthen the demand side of governance so as to improve performance in 
primary schools. This paper recommends a number of measures: 
• Strengthening the boards or SMCs of primary schools. 
• Undertaking targeted programmes to raise parents’ awareness of their responsibilities – 
for example ensuring children’s attendance at school, buying scholastic materials, paying 
school dues promptly, and providing lunch for pupils. 
• Reducing unhelpful interference by politicians in governance at the district and school 
level, by clearly articulating their roles and responsibilities. 
• Creating community-based monitoring structures, similar to local council structures in 
charge of education, on which parents are represented. 
• Developing clear reporting and feedback mechanisms between the public and DEOs, 
which would include the provision of information to the public on school calendars.  
 
In principle, the demand and supply sides of governance should complement each other to find an 
equilibrium (World Bank 2012b). This paper therefore recommends that reforms on the supply side of 
primary education in Uganda should also continue, including: 
• Establishing a living wage for teachers.  
• Introducing a quota for districts in the recruitment of ‘native’ and non-‘native’ teachers, to 
avoid nepotism and expose teachers to different environments and teaching practices.  
• Institute a policy to recruit specialist teachers as it is the practice in private schools so as 
to increase the likelihood of obtaining better pass rates in public schools.  
• An increase in UPE funding to offset escalating prices of materials and base the funding on needs. 
• A reduction in unplanned or abrupt transfers of teachers, confirmation in post of those working 
in an ‘acting’ capacity, and promotion of those who have upgraded qualifications. 
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• Continue with other ongoing interventions such as classroom construction, building of 
teachers’ houses, recruiting more teachers, and providing up-to-date textbooks. 
•  School administrators and teachers should also be trained in how to persuade parents to 
send their children to school.  
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